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MORRIS COMMUNICATIONS V. PGA TOUR:
BATTLE OVER THE RIGHTS TO REAL-TIME
SPORTS SCORES
By Andrea Freeman
The new form of instantaneous communication made possible by the
Internet has created an exciting attraction for sports enthusiasts: real-time
sports scores. Now, fans stuck at work or lacking access to live or tele-
vised sporting events can follow sports in real time by logging on to any
number of sports websites. Major producers of sports news, such as Sports
Illustrated and ESPN, sponsor websites that provide real-time sports
scores, as do all of the major sports franchises, such as the National Bas-
ketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL), the Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB). These
sites appeal to a wide range of sports consumers, from high-stakes gam-
blers to casual fans.
Real-time scores represent a significant potential source of revenues
for sports conglomerates.' This potential has created a competitive market
for the scores and has led to litigation over who controls the right to dis-
seminate and thereby profit from the information. Parties seeking to com-
pete in the market have proceeded on different legal theories, includinq
misappropriation, anticompetitive behavior, and copyright infringement.
Sports scores do not fit neatly into any intellectual property definition, and
the only two cases to address the issue to date-NBA v. Motorola, Inc. and
Morris Communications v. PGA Tour--drew different conclusions as to
the proper categorization. While the Motorola court determined that real-
time sports scores are mere facts that no one can own,3 the PGA Tour
© 2005 Andrea Freeman
1. See Louis Klein, Misappropriation Doctrine: National Basketball Association v.
Motorola, Inc.: Future Prospects for Protecting Real-Time Information, 64 BROOK. L.
REv. 585, 585 (1998) ("[R]eal-time information... may be the most sought after, highly
prized species of information available."); Gary R. Roberts, The Scope of the Exclusive
Right to Control Dissemination of Real-Time Sports Event Information, 15 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 167, 168 (2004) (arguing that the ability to profit from the sale of real-time
information hinges on sports promoters' ability to gain exclusive rights to the informa-
tion).
2. Bruce Keller argues that statutory law is inadequate to address the demands of
high technology represented by real-time sports scores. Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to
Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theo-
ries of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 428 (1998).
3. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).
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court suggested that a compilation of scores constitutes property that the
company who created the compilation may legally protect.4
This Note explores legal tactics and theories applicable to controver-
sies over real-time sports scores. Part I describes the most recent case in
the field, PGA Tour. Part II discusses two legal regimes that parties have
used in attempts to create or deny ownership of real-time sports scores: the
Sherman Act and the doctrine of misappropriation. In Part III, this Note
compares the Second Circuit's treatment of real-time sports scores in Mo-
torola to the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in PGA Tour, and concludes that,
although both emphasized free-riding as central to their holdings, the
courts ultimately based their decisions on varying interpretations of prop-
erty issues. Next, the Part addresses these underlying property issues and
contemplates how they may inform future attempts to protect real-time
sports scores. Finally, this Note examines the broader interests of consum-
ers and producers in the dissemination of real-time sports scores and how
the courts might best serve those interests.
I. CASE SUMMARY
A. Facts
Plaintiff Morris Communications is a media company that publishes
print and electronic newspapers; 5 defendant PGA Tours ("PGA") sponsors
the most popular series of professional golf tournaments in the world.6
PGA invested a substantial sum to develop a Real-Time Scoring System
("RTSS") to compile tournament scores. To operate the RTSS, PGA en-
gaged volunteer "walking scorers" to follow each group of golfers on the
course and tabulate the scores of each player.7 "Hole reporters" then re-
layed this information to a production truck that compiled the scores and
transmitted them to electronic leaderboards, distributed along the golf
course, which typically reflected the scores of only the top ten or fifteen
players, as well as to the on-site "media center" and the webpage "pga-
tour.com." 8 PGA prohibited the use of wireless devices by the press or
public during tournaments, making the RTSS the sole source of compiled
golf scores for the full list of tournament players.
9
4. Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1296 n.13
(11 th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter PGA Tour III].
5. Id. at 1290.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1290-91.
8. Id. at 1291.
9. Id.
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PGA required media organizations to agree to a set of terms and condi-
tions called the On-Line Service Regulations ("OLSR") to gain access to
the media center. The OLSR mandated a delay in publishing scoring in-
formation until (1) thirty minutes after a player's shot or (2) PGA pub-
lished scoring information on pgatour.com.' 0 PGA revised the OLSR in
January 2000 to prohibit credentialed media from selling or syndicating
scoring information to uncredentialed third-party website publishers with-
out a special license purchased from PGA. 1
Prior to PGA's revision of the OLSR, Morris Communications-
PGA's only major competitor in the syndication market for real-time golf
scores12-had contracted with several Internet publishers to sell real-time
scores from PGA tournaments. 13 In an effort to retain the potential profits
from these agreements, 14 Morris Communications sought to enjoin PGA
from enforcing the OLSR, alleging that the rules constituted four separate
violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act: (1) a monopolization of the
Internet markets; (2) an unlawful refusal to deal; (3) monopoly leveraging;
and (4) an attempted monopolization of the Internet markets.
1 5
B. Procedural History
Morris Communications filed a complaint and motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction in the district court in October 2000, seeking to prevent
PGA from conditioning Morris Communications' accreditation for the
Tampa Bay Classic on an agreement not to syndicate real-time scores.
1 6
Finding that "real-time golf scoires represent the end product of a system
which defendant has deliberately designed for their production," and that
Morris Communications' claims constituted an attempt to free-ride on




12. In fact, Morris Communications published real-time golf scores on the Internet
before PGA. Initial Brief of Appellant at 8, Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour,
Inc., 364 F.3d 1288 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-10226, 03-11502).
13. Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1325
(M.D. Fla. 2000) [hereinafter PGA Tour I].
14. Morris stood to lose approximately $280,000 due to the change in PGA's terms.
See Jonathan Ringel, PGA Media Fight Set to Tee Off at 1 1th Circuit, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Jan. 5, 2004 (reporting that Morris' contracts with CNN dropped from
$430,000 to $150,000 under the new rules), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1071
719761758.
15. PGA Tour II, 364 F.3d at 1292.
16. PGA Tour I, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.
17. Id. at 1329.
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In December 2002, the district court granted PGA's motion for sum-
mary judgment on all counts, finding that PGA's desire to prevent Morris
Communications from free-riding on PGA's investment in the RTSS con-
stituted a valid business justification for the OLSR. 18 Morris Communica-
tions subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment based on
PGA's adoption of new terms of service.1 9 Finding these new conditions
beyond the scope of the initial lawsuit, the court denied the motion.2 °
C. The Eleventh Circuit's Analysis
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's decision to
grant PGA's motion for summary judgment on all counts, and further re-
viewed the court's denial of Morris Communications' motion for relief
from judgment due to abuse of discretion.2 ' Declaring intellectual property
and First Amendment issues irrelevant, the court considered only whether
PGA's restrictions on Morris Communications violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act.22 The court found that they did not.
Asserting that any company, even a monopolist, that invests in a valu-
able product has a right not to provide that product to competitors for free,
the court labeled Morris Communications' demands to syndicate the
scores compiled by the RTSS without paying a license fee a "classic ex-
ample of free-riding., 23 The prevention of free-riding provided PGA with
a legitimate, pro-competitive reason to impose restrictions on the media's
access to its events; 24 the court's finding of a legitimate business justifica-
tion for PGA's conduct effectively disposed of Morris Communications'
claims.
The court only briefly reviewed each of Morris Communications' four
antitrust claims. Referring to the first claim-monopolization of Internet
markets-the court merely described the rules and elements of monopoli-
zation. It then concluded that "even if PGA is monopolistic, and even if
18. See Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1269,
1285-87 (M.D. Fla. 2002) [hereinafter PGA Tour II].
19. The new terms required organizations wishing to use the information displayed
on the PGA website for commercial purposes to purchase a license from PGA. See PGA
Tour II, 364 F.3d at 1291.
20. Id. at 1292.
21. Id.
22. A summary of Morris Communications' attorney's arguments on these issues
appears in John Hanusz, 1 1 th Circuit Takes Swing at Real-time Golf Score Dispute, FUL-
TON COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 22, 2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=107
4259249111.
23. PGA Tour III, 364 F.3d at 1298.
24. Id.
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PGA refused to deal with. Morris Communications, it has not violated sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act" because PGA had a legitimate business justifi-
cation for its actions. 25 The court then quickly disposed of the fourth
claim-attempt to monopolize-in a footnote, explaining that its dismissal
of the monopolization claim rendered this claim irrelevant.26 The court
then proceeded to the second claim: refusal to deal. As with the first claim,
the court merely set out the attributes of a refusal to deal claim and then
dismissed the claim without further analysis. Finally, the court declined to
examine the monopoly leveraging claim, due to its similarity to the refusal
to deal claim.27
For the claim of monopolization, once the court found that PGA's ef-
forts to prevent Morris Communications from free-riding constituted a
valid business justification for creating and enforcing the OLSR, the bur-
den shifted to Morris Communications to show that PGA's proffered justi-
fication was merely pretextual. To meet this burden, Morris Communica-
tions relied on a series of cases involving defendants who prevented the
sale of products that the plaintiffs had created or purchased themselves.28
The court found these cases distinguishable because it was PGA, not Mor-
ris Communications, who compiled the golf scores. 29 The court also con-
trasted cases where defendants refused to sell to plaintiffs with the case at
bar, where PGA had in fact demonstrated its willingness to sell by offering
Morris Communications a license.30 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both
the district court's summary judgment in favor of PGA on all counts and
its denial of Morris Communications' motion for relief from judgment.3'
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
In PGA Tour, Morris Communications attempted to foreclose PGA's
imposition of restrictions on Morris Communications' ability to sell com-
piled real-time golf scores to third parties by alleging violations of the
25. Id. at 1295.
26. See id. at 1293 n.10. The court also indicated that the attempt to monopolize
claim was harder to prove because of the additional intent requirement. Id.
27. Id. at 1294n.11.
28. Id. at 1297 (citing Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451
(1992); Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Lorain
Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); and others).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1298.
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Sherman Act.32 Section 2 of the Sherman Act ensures that "[elvery person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States... shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
ony., 33 Monopolization has two elements: "(1) the possession of monop-
oly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power, as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent." 4 The plaintiff need not show that an attempt was successful; the
Sherman Act also protects against "dangerous probability."
'3 5
With respect to the first element of monopolization, courts have de-
fined monopoly power as the ability to control prices or exclude competi-
tion.36 The relevant market generally refers to "commodities reasonably
interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes. 37 To identify the
relevant market, a trier of fact must decide whether a product is unique or
has suitable substitutes. 38 Parties may be competing with each other either
in or for the relevant market.
39
As for the second element, "willful acquisition" requires predatory or
unreasonably exclusionary acts or practices that prevent or exclude com-
petition.40 An act is predatory if it attempts to exclude rivals on a basis
other than efficiency. 41 Finally, to satisfy an attempt to monopolize claim,
a plaintiff must prove (1) predatory or anticompetitive conduct; (2) spe-
cific intent to monopolize; and (3) dangerous probability of achieving mo-
nopoly power.
42
32. These claims were: (1) monopolization of the Internet markets; (2) unlawful
refusal to deal; (3) monopoly leveraging; and (4) attempted monopolization of the Inter-
net markets. See id. at 1292.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
34. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
35. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951).
36. United States v. Griffith, 344 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (citing Am. Tobacco Co. V.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 811, 814 (1946)).
37. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
38. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 531 (7th Cir. 1986).
39. Id.
40. See Trans Sport Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 188 (2d Cir.
1992).
41. Id. at 189 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 605 (1985)).
42. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 80 (D.D.C. 2001).
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Under the Sherman Act, possession of monopoly power is not unlaw-
ful unless the second element of monopolization is satisfied.43 A defendant
may also escape section 2 liability by demonstrating a valid business justi-
fication for its anticompetitive acts. 44 Under these circumstances, the bur-
den shifts to the plaintiff to show that the justification is merely pretex-
tual.45 Consumer welfare is often a significant consideration when analyz-
ing the validity of business practices. 46 By protecting competition, anti-
trust law ensures that a free-market system benefits consumers with prices
regulated naturally by the marketplace.4 7
Generally, "a firm possessing monopoly power has no duty to cooper-
ate with its business rivals." 48 However, some refusals to deal that extend
monopoly power from one market into another violate the Sherman Act.49
Courts have analyzed these types of claims using two primary tests: the
essential facilities doctrine and the intent test.50 Under the essential facili-
ties doctrine, the owner of a facility that cannot easily be duplicated and to
which access is necessary in order to compete in the relevant market must
make that facility available to competitors on nondiscriminatory terms.51
The facility in question need not be completely indispensable, but its du-
plication should be economically infeasible and denial of its use must in-
flict a "severe handicap" on potential competitors. 52 Under the intent test,
a monopolist may not impair competition by intentionally excluding com-
petitors unnecessarily.
53
43. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S.
Ct. 872, 879 (2004) ("[T]he possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful
unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.").
44. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 597. However, in a later decision, the Court de-
termined that a defendant need not demonstrate valid business justification to escape sec-
tion 2 liability in refusal to deal cases. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. at 881.
45. Starter Sportswear, 964 F.2d at 191.
46. Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 535 (7th Cir. 1986).
47. Id. at 536.
48. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 600.
49. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 539 (explaining that control of an essential facility may
violate section 2 because it extends monopoly power beyond one market or production
stage).
50. The Supreme Court has never explicitly approved of the essential facilities doc-
trine. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44 ("Given our conclusion that the evidence
amply supports the verdict.., we find it unnecessary to consider the possible relevance
of the 'essential facilities' doctrine.").
51. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 539.
52. Id. (quoting Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.D.C. 1977)).
53. See PGA Tour 111, 364 F.3d 1288, 1294 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (citing Mid-Texas
Communications Sys. v. AT&T, 615 F.2d 1372, 1388 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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B. Misappropriation
The Second Circuit used the doctrine of misappropriation to analyze
claims involving real-time sports scores in NBA v. Motorola, Inc.54 The
doctrine of misappropriation, first declared in 1918, underwent a series of
significant changes throughout the twentieth century and nearly disap-
peared after the abolition of federal common law in 1938." In 1997, the
Motorola court revitalized the doctrine, setting forth a list of elements for
a "hot news" misappropriation claim.56
The Supreme Court created the federal common law claim of misap-
propriation in International News Service v. Associated Press ("INS")'.57 In
INS, defendant International News Service's (INS) copied news stories
from the bulletins and early editions of plaintiff Associated Press (AP)
east coast newspapers, selling the stories as its own in west coast mar-
kets. The Court analyzed the case according to the principles of unfair
competition law and determined that although news generally is not copy-
rightable, under the facts of the case, where AP had invested great effort
and expense in its product, AP could enjoin INS from replicating and sell-
ing its stories. 59 Significantly, the Court afforded AP protection of its news
stories only as long as the stories retained commercial value due to their
newsworthiness.6 ° Courts later interpreted this condition to mean that only
parties in direct competition with each other that derive value from the de-
54. 105 F.3d 841, 852.(2d Cir. 1997). A number of interesting articles explore the
significance of the Motorola decision. See generally Alan D. Lieb, NBA v. Motorola and
Stats, Inc.: The Second Circuit Properly Limits the "Hot News Doctrine", 16 J. MAR-
SHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 197 (1999) (predicting that sports leagues will never be
able to claim exclusive rights over real-time game information); Clifford N. MacDonald,
Gamecasts and NBA v. Motorola: Do They Still Love This Game?,. 5 N.C. J.L. & Tech.
329 (2004) (arguing that Congress should amend the Copyright Act to protect gamecast-
ing).
55. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For an extensive history of
the misappropriation doctrine, see Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation Is Seventy-Five
Years Old; Should We Bury It or Revive It?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 781 (1994). Some commen-
tators lament both the creation and return of the misappropriation doctrine. See Richard
A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. REV. 621 (2003); Leo J. Raskind,
The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75
MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991) (suggesting a revision of the misappropriation doctrine based
on the incorporation of competitive principles).
56. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 852.
57. 248 U.S. 215 (1918)
58. Id. at 231.
59. Id. at 242.
60. See id. at 245.
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lay in the dissemination of information may succeed on a misappropriation
claim.
61
INS remained good law until 1938, when Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
abolished federal common law, making federal misappropriation claims
obsolete.62 The tort of misappropriation survived as state law in many
states, where courts often allowed it as a cause of action in cases involving
copyright law.63 Subsequent cases developed the "competitive injury re-
quirement" more fully. In National Football League v. Governor of Dela-
ware, the court refused to find misappropriation of the NFL's investments
and reputation by a state football lottery, partly because the parties' busi-
nesses did not compete with each other and thus the defendants' actions
did not harm the plaintiff in its primary market.64 Later, in an influential
dissent in Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., Justice Simon argued that
in misappropriation cases, to preserve intellectual property's policy goal of
balancing the incentives of authors and inventors with the public good, the
owner of the property at issue must show that defendant's free-riding will
inhibit the owner's continued production of the product or service at is-
sue.
65
In Motorola, the Second Circuit further clarified what remains of the
misappropriation doctrine created in INS. The NBA sought to enjoin Mo-
torola from disseminating real-time basketball scores and other statistics
on a "Sportstrax" pager, which Motorola designed specifically for this
purpose.66 Motorola gathered information through reporters who watched
games on television or listened to the games on the radio, sending infor-
mation to a host computer that retransmitted the data via satellite to indi-
vidual pagers. 67 Claiming that Motorola's actions infringed its rights to the
scores, the NBA filed a claim of misappropriation. Because Motorola used
its own resources to collect the data it transmitted on Sportstrax, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that Motorola did not free-ride on the NBA's "hot
news" property.
68
61. See Nat'l Football League v. Governor of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377
(D. Del. 1977).
62. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
63. For example, in Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d
973, 976 (9th Cir. 1987), plaintiffs accused defendants of misappropriating plaintiff's
"time and effort" in creating a map and document.
64. See 435 F. Supp. at 1378.
65. 456 N.E.2d 84, 91-92 (I11. 1983) (Simon, J., dissenting).
66. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997).
67. Id. at 844.
68. Free-riding is the third essential element of a "hot news" misappropriation
claim. Id. at 845.
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After surveying the history of misappropriation claims, the Second
Circuit laid out the elements of a "hot news" misappropriation claim:
(i) the plaintiff generates or collects information at some cost or
expense,
(ii) the value of the information is highly time-sensitive,
(iii) the defendant's use of the information constitutes free-riding
on the plaintiff's costly efforts to generate or collect it,
(iv) the defendant's use of the information is in direct competi-
tion with a product or service offered by the plaintiff,
(v) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the
plaintiff would so reduce the incentive to produce the prod-
uct or service that its existence or quality would be substan-
tially threatened[.]
69
Analyzing the NBA's claims according to these elements, the court found
that Motorola's Sportstrax product did not interfere in any way with the
NBA's primary markets, namely, live and television audiences for basket-
ball games.7 0 In fact, Motorola designed its product specifically to appeal
to individuals unable to participate in either of these markets. Recognizing
the existence of a separate market for "real-time transmission of factual
information," the court determined that Motorola's Sportstrax did not free-
ride on the NBA's similar Gamestats product because each company bore
its own costs of collecting the information and the NBA did not demon-
strate any damage arising from Motorola's alleged free-riding.
7'
Generally, courts analyzing claims under both the misappropriation
doctrine and the Sherman Act have struggled to find a balance between
regulating inappropriate behavior and allowing the free market to flour-
ish.72
III. DISCUSSION
A. Sherman Act Violations
The PGA Tour court's determination that the prevention of free-riding
constituted a valid business justification precluded any analysis of Morris
69. Id. at 852.
70. Id. at 853-54.
71. Id. at 854.
72. First Amendment concerns may also weigh against findings of misappropriation
in real-time sports score cases. See Note, Nothing But Internet, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1143
(1997).
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Communications' antitrust claims, and thus left open the question of how
a court would rule on the allegations if this justification did not exist. Ad-
ditionally, the court's decision not to apply the essential facilities doctrine
to the facts foreclosed an examination into whether denying Morris Com-
munications access to the media center represented an exclusionary act
that Morris Communications might have had better success litigating un-
der the Sherman Act. This Note argues that because Morris Communica-
tions had the right to copy a compilation of facts under copyright law, the
court should have rejected the prevention of free-riding as a valid business
justification and proceeded with a thorough analysis of all of Morris
Communications' claims.
1. Monopolization
Had the court analyzed Morris Communications' Sherman Act claims
instead of relying on PGA's proffered business justification to dispose of
them, the court would have concluded that PGA's monopoly of the com-
piled real-time scores was not unlawful.
When analyzing a monopolization claim, a court must identify the
relevant market.73 Although PGA's primary market was the market for
golf tournaments or, more generally, large sporting events (placing it in
competition with other popular spectator sports such as tennis and
hockey), its success in these markets allowed it to expand and compete in
other, related markets, such as the Internet. On the Internet, PGA com-
peted for a share of the market for sports or golf-related websites and for
dominance in the sub-market for real-time golf scores.
Morris Communications, whose primary market is print and electronic
newspapers, competed with PGA in the market for real-time golf scores
and its syndication. PGA held a monopoly in this market attributable ei-
ther to its superior ability to satisfy consumers or to its exclusionary or
predatory behavior towards its competitors. The court likely would not
have found PGA's conduct to be predatory or exclusionary because PGA
did not forcibly shut Morris Communications out of the syndication mar-
ket for real-time scores. Instead, PGA used its position in the market to
require a licensing fee from competitors in exchange for certain rights as-
sociated with access to PGA's private events. This conduct merely repre-
sents sharp business acumen, a lawful source of monopolization under the
Sherman Act.
73. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
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An analysis of monopolization should also take into account potential
harms or benefits to consumers flowing from the monopolist's actions.
74
In this case, different consumer interests would be served by PGA's mo-
nopoly than by Morris Communications' ability to compete for syndica-
tion, and it is unclear which would weigh more heavily.
On one hand, Morris Communications could decide not to pay PGA's
licensing fee. Morris Communications might choose instead simply to
abandon its contracts to syndicate the scores.75 As a result, pgatour.com
would have no competitors, and thus PGA would have little need to im-
prove its site for an already captive audience of fans seeking real-time golf
scores. The incentive for competitors to draw consumers by other means
would increase, possibly creating more desirable golf-related websites,
which would contribute to an overall increase in satisfaction for Internet-
using golf fans.
On the other hand, Morris Communications could decide to pay the li-
censing fee. This would likely divert resources from other areas of its
business that may have provided valuable services to consumers. How-
ever, if pgatour.com had to compete with other providers of real-time golf
scores, PGA might devote more resources to its own website, thereby in-
creasing. consumer satisfaction. In light of these considerations, the court
might have concluded that PGA's monopoly was not an unlawful one
simply because it did not create a situation affecting consumers or the
market greatly enough to satisfy the second element of monopolization.
While this would dispose of the plaintiff's claims of monopolization and
attempted monopolization, the court would still need to consider the re-
fusal to deal and monopoly leveraging claims.
2. Essential Facilities Doctrine
Based on the property considerations discussed below, if the court had
not accepted PGA's business justification, it might have applied the essen-
tial facilities doctrine to its analysis of Morris Communications' claims of
refusal to deal and monopoly-leveraging. Morris Communications could
make a persuasive argument that PGA's media center is an essential facil-
ity that PGA must make accessible to Morris Communications: without
access to the center, Morris Communications simply cannot compete in
the market for syndicated real-time golf scores. Moreover, the center can-
not be duplicated; PGA's prohibition of the use of wireless devices elimi-
74. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 535-36 (7th Cir. 1986).
75. This argument assumes that, under the circumstances, this decision would repre-
sent an efficient hreach of contract-
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nated any possibility of creating a system independent of the RTSS that
would produce compiled real-time scores.
A finding that the media center is an essential facility would not only
suggest that without PGA's valid business justification, Morris Communi-
cations would have succeeded on its refusal to deal claim. But, such a
finding would also raise the issue of whether courts should allow busi-
nesses to deny the press the ability to cover events in order to preserve the
organizers. own economic interests. This issue has arisen in relation to
local coverage of Olympic events as well as in a recent European case dis-
puting the rights to photographs of a soccer match.76 PGA Tour suggests a
leniency towards businesses engaging in self-help remedies and a reluc-
tance to interfere with contracts freely made by independent parties-an
approach later adopted by the Supreme Court in another refusal to deal




If the court had analyzed the facts of PGA Tour as a misappropriation
claim brought by PGA, it would have found that the real-time golf scores
do not meet the "hot news" exception and that PGA could not constrain
Morris Communications from doing what it wished with the scores, in-
cluding syndicating the information to third-party real-time sports scores
providers. As plaintiff, PGA would probably meet the first four elements
of a "hot news" claim: PGA generates and collects the information at
some cost or expense; the value of the information is highly time-
sensitive; Morris Communications' use of the information constitutes free-
riding on PGA's costly efforts to generate or collect it; and Morris Com-
munications' use of the information is in direct competition with a product
78or service offered by PGA.
However, PGA would not succeed on the fifth element of the claim,
which requires that Morris Communications' ability to free-ride on PGA's
efforts would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that
its existence or quality would be substantially threatened. PGA compiles
76. See Doreen Carvajal, Clash Over Internet Sports Photos, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Oct. 25, 2004 (describing battles in Europe between soccer leagues and newspaper pub-
lishers over the right to control the release of photographs: "'What this is all about is
football's awareness of the value of live or near-live publishing"'), http://www.nytimes.
com/2004/10/25/technology/25photo.html?oref-login&th.
77. 124 S. Ct. 872, 881 (2004).
78. For the elements of a "hot news" misappropriation claim, see Nat'l Basketball
Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852 (2d Cir. 1997).
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players' scores via the RTSS to determine the placement order of competi-
tors and to reflect these scores to the players, the fans in attendance, and
the general public. In fact, PGA created and maintained the RTSS to meet
this essential business need for accurate scoring. Therefore, even if the
court did not find misappropriation and allowed Morris Communications
access to the real-time scores without requiring the payment of a licensing
fee for the right to syndicate them, PGA would undoubtedly continue its
operation of the system.
PGA did contend, however, that without the extra revenue it could
generate by collecting licensing fees from Morris Communications and
other potential competitors, it might not be inclined to invest in improve-
ments to the RTSS. 79 Realistically, the licensing fee represents merely an
extra opportunity for PGA to profit; PGA would continue to maintain the
highest quality system possible to meet its own goals. Thus, because Mor-
ris Communications' actions would not "substantially threaten" the quality
or existence of the RTSS, a misappropriation claim under these facts
would fail.
C. Distinguishing PGA Tour from Motorola
The Motorola court based its holding on the fact that Motorola used its
own resources to collect scores and thus was not free-riding on the NBA's
efforts. Free-riding also informed the holding in PGA Tour, where the
Eleventh Circuit found the prevention of free-riding to be a valid business
justification for PGA's alleged anticompetitive acts.80 The similarities be-
tween these two cases substantially end here.
Several facts distinguished Motorola from PGA Tour, causing the
PGA Tour court to allow PGA to control the dissemination of real-time
scores where the Motorola court refused to allow the NBA to do so.
Whereas the public normally has access to basketball scores while a game
is in progress, the scores of golfers participating in a PGA tournament are
not as readily available. 8' Additionally, Motorola employed its own staff
to collect the NBA scores; Morris Communications was unable to do this
because PGA prohibited the use of wireless devices at tournaments.82 This
79. Brief of Appellee at 11, PGA Tour III, 364 F.3d 1288 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-
10226c, 03-11503-cc) ("[T]o the extent we can't maximize or get some type of return on
the investment that we're making in the scoring system, I think we would be less inclined
to continue to try to improve it and make a better system.") (quoting PGA vice-president
Edward Moorhouse).
80. See PGA Tour 111, 364 F.3d at 1290.
81. See Database Protection in the USA, ius mentis, http://www.iusmentis.com/
databases/us (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
82. PGA TourlII, 364 F.3dat 1291.
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prohibition gave PGA exclusive access to scores for the full list of players.
Unlike the NBA, PGA also claimed a proprietary interest in both the sys-
tem it used to compile scores and the results it produced. Furthermore, by
predicating access to the media center on agreement to a set of rules re-
quiring the payment of a licensing fee for the right to syndicate the scores,
PGA maintained control over their dissemination.
83
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in PGA Tour depended on PGA's
"property interest" in its product. 84 Nonetheless, the court did not identify
the source of this interest. In fact, in contrast to the Motorola court's in-
depth discussion of copyright-the result of extensive briefing on the sub-
ject-the Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with an express rejection of
copyright's relevance to the case. 85 Although the Eleventh Circuit declined
to analyze copyright issues, these issues seem to lie at the heart of both the
Motorola and PGA Tour decisions and to account for the tension that ex-
ists between them. 86 By failing to identify the source of the property inter-
est it upheld, the PGA Tour court skirted the complex intellectual property
issues underlying its holding-issues that the Motorola court expressly
addressed.
D. Copyright Law
Had the Eleventh Circuit analyzed PGA Tour under copyright law, it
would have found that PGA had no right to protect the real-time scores
that it compiled. The compiled scores resemble the data compilations at
issue in Feist. In that case, the Supreme Court held that despite the exten-
sive labor and resources, or "sweat of the brow," invested in making data
compilations such as telephone books, copyright law does not protect such
compilations because they consist purely of uncopyrightable facts.87 The
Feist Court conceded that some elements of a data compilation, such as its
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1296 n.13.
85. Id. at 1292 ("Before discussing the antitrust issues in this case, it is important to
note what this case is not about. Contrary to the arguments of Morris and its amici curiae,
this case is not about copyright law[.]").
86. For an analysis of Motorola's effect on the protection of database contents, see
David Djavaherian, Hot News and No Cold Facts: NBA v. Motorola and the Protection
ofDatabase Contents, 5 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8 (1998). For commentary on preemption
after Motorola, see Mark A. Feest, National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.:
Does the Copyright Act Partially Preempt State Misappropriation Claims?, 24 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 99 (1998); Jean Tibbetts, National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc.: Second
Circuit Clarifies Copyright Preemption for New Technology, 3 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 16
(1997).
87. Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). Facts alone also
are not copyrightable. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880).
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arrangement or presentation, could contain a spark of originality that af-
forded copyright protection to those specific elements. However, the
Court maintained that the law still would not protect the data itself.8 9 The
compiled scores produced by the RTSS were not arranged in any creative
order, nor were they presented in a unique fashion; therefore, under copy-
right law, PGA could not protect these facts or their arrangement.
The PGA Tour court avoided this precedent by denying the relevance
of any copyright case law. However, by allowing PGA to create and en-
force a contract that let it ignore Feist's holding, the court followed an al-
ternate line of copyright cases. ProCD v. Zeidenberg and its progeny have
condoned the expansion of copyright law through contract and rejected
claims of federal preemption. 90 In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
plaintiffs right to control the use of facts contained in its database of tele-
phone numbers by requiring purchasers to agree not to distribute or repro-
duce the numbers through a "shrinkwrap" license.91 ProCD sparked a con-
troversy over the scope of federal preemption and the extent to which par-
ties may negotiate around the rules of copyright.92
Even if a party alleges state law claims that are facially unrelated to
copyright, these claims may be preempted because copyright law bears on
''all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright." 93 Courts decide whether
preemption comes into play by determining (1) whether the work falls un-
der the subject matter of copyright94 and (2) whether the rights granted
88. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-62.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a
contract prohibiting copying of plaintiffs telephone database even though plaintiff had
no exclusive rights under the Copyright Act); Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. LRP Publ'ns,
Inc., No. Civ. A 00-1859, 2000 WL 433998, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2000) ("[T]he vast
weight of authority holds that state law misappropriation and unfair competition claims
that are really claims for unauthorized copying are preempted.").
91. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455. A shrinkwrap agreement is one that binds a consumer
once she removes the packaging containing the product.
92. For more thorough analyses of the issues raised by this trend, see Mark A. Lem-
ley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87
CALIF. L. REv. 111 (1999) (advocating the use of the copyright misuse doctrine and state
and federal public policy to supplement contract preemption); David Nimmer et al., The
Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 17 (1999).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000); see also Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n., 805 F.2d 663, 676 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[Section] 301(a) preempts
all equivalent state-law rights claimed in any work within the subject matter of copyright
whether or not the work embodies any creativity.").
94. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.
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under state law are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights granted in
§ 106 of the Copyright Act.95
Although the Copyright Act states that facts fall outside of its protec-
96tion, courts have determined that the Act may nonetheless preempt state
laws that protect uncopyrightable facts with copyright-like protection.97 In
such cases, courts have developed the extra element test to analyze the
second, or equivalency requirement of preemption. This test asks whether
a state law claim requires an element instead of or in addition to any of the
exclusive rights listed in § 106 and whether this element transforms the
action into something qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim.98 If an extra element exists, the claim, such as for breach of con-
tract, survives federal preemption.
99
Some courts have stated that the mere element of a promise in contract
claims, that is, the need to show an offer, acceptance, and bargain during
the formation of a contract, constitutes an extra element that allows state
law to adjudicate all contract cases dealing with copyright. 100 Other courts,
following ProCD, have distinguished contract claims from copyright
claims based on their differing scopes: "A copyright is a right against the
world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers
may do as they please, so contracts do not create 'exclusive rights."'
10 1
However, even courts that have recognized the inherent presence of extra
elements in contracts have acknowledged that no blanket rule about pre-
emption in contract cases exists.
1°2
Applying the extra element test to PGA Tour, the court might have
found that the licensing agreement embodied in the OLSR constituted an
extra element because it regulated activities, such as access to the media
95. These rights include reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution
and public performance. Id. § 106 (1)-(4).
96. Id. § 102(b).
97. See, e.g., Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1058 (C.D.
Cal. 2000) ("An item.., such as an idea, procedure, process, etc., does not receive copy-
right protection but is nevertheless within the subject matter of copyright for purposes of
preemption.").
98. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001)
99. See id.; see also Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 n.14 (D.N.J. 1999)
(listing cases where courts found no preemption in breach of contract actions).
100. Taco Bell, 256 F.3d at 456 ("The extra element is the promise to pay.").
101. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); cf Kabehie v.
Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 731 (Ct. App. 2002).
102. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("ProCD and the other contract cases are .. . careful not to create a blanket rule that all
contracts will escape preemption.").
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center, that do not constitute copyrightable subject matter. However, the
central issue-syndication of the scores-falls under at least two of copy-
right's exclusive rights, namely, reproduction and distribution.'0 3 Further-
more, PGA's licensing agreement would not transform Morris Communi-
cations' cause of action into something qualitatively different from an is-
sue that would be litigated under copyright law. Therefore, courts that
have been lenient with the test, allowing almost anything to constitute an
extra element, would not find preemption. In contrast, courts requiring a
significant departure from copyright issues to satisfy the extra element test
likely would find preemption under these facts.
Therefore, if the real-time sports scores compiled by PGA were classi-
fied as facts, PGA could not use copyright law to prevent Morris Commu-
nications from doing with them what it desired, including syndication. Al-
though this result might seem unfair in light of PGA's investment in the
RTSS, in the greater context of copyright law, unfair results occasionally
must balance out correct decisions that arise from the same law applied to
different sets of facts. Important policy considerations underlie copyright
law: it is designed to maintain a rich public domain, while creating incen-
tives for the development of human knowledge and creativity. 10 4 PGA's
inability to add to its annual revenue by collecting licensing fees for real-
time golf scores seems like a small sacrifice to make in light of these
greater goals.
IV. CONCLUSION
To avoid granting too much power over information to sports monopo-
lies, courts deciding future cases concerning real-time sports scores should
interpret PGA Tour's holding narrowly-thus applying solely to the
unique set of facts presented by a golf tournament-where it is impossible
for individuals independently to observe and record all of the event's ac-
tivities. Although a similar set of circumstances might arise at a tennis
tournament or other sporting events that take place in several locations
simultaneously, applying PGA Tour's holding to other sports could harm-
fully aggrandize sports monopolies such as the NFL and MLB. Taken
even further, this type of control over information also raises legitimate
concerns regarding the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First
103. For another point of view, see Marc S. Williams, Copyright Preemption: Real-
Time Dissemination of Sports Scores and Information, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 445 (1998)
(arguing that the scores and statistics of sporting events do not fall within the subject mat-
ter of copyright).
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Amendment. Therefore, courts should constantly guard against removing
too much information from the public domain and imposing excessive re-
strictions on Internet publication. To accomplish this goal, courts should
be vigilant about identifying claims preempted by copyright law.
